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Abstract
The Internet has become an essential part of daily life for almost everyone in 
society having grown far beyond its roots in the 1970s as the ARPANET, a network 
that was principally the domain of scientists and engineers. The popularity of the 
HTTP, developed at CERN in the late 1980s led to the widespread use of the term 
‘the web’ as a generic name for the Internet for many years, at least in the public 
domain. Of course, the Internet is much more than just web browsing and, in recent 
years, the term cyberspace has become the most popular term to describe interac-
tions over the Internet. Yet, an unambiguous definition of the term is difficult to 
formulate . Financial institutions underpinning the economy and the operation of 
national critical infrastructures, such as monitoring and control of the electricity 
supply, are now dependent on the Internet. A consequence of this is that cyberat-
tacks become more costly for the victims and perversely more attractive to the 
criminals who carry them out . The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) and 
edge computing as a new paradigm creates the potential for enhanced productivity 
but at the same time opens up new opportunities for cyberattacks while still being 
exposed to existing attach vectors such as the well-known denial of service attack 
(DDoS), which can take place in many forms . In this chapter, we described the 
challenges in building an edge system that is secure against cyberattack. We begin 
by briefly reviewing the architecture of communications over the Internet and later 
consider the new challenges that follow from operating the hardware with values of 
voltage, frequency and current that enable more energy efficiency.
Keywords: security, energy efficiency, performance, cloud, edge computing
1. Introduction
The Internet has become an essential part of daily life for almost everyone in 
society having grown far beyond its roots in the 1970s as the ARPANET, a network 
that was principally the domain of scientists and engineers. The popularity of the 
HTTP, developed at CERN in the late 1980s, led to the widespread use of the term 
‘the web’ as a generic name for the Internet for many years, at least in the public 
domain. Of course, the Internet is much more than just web browsing and, in recent 
years, the term cyberspace has become the most popular term to describe interac-
tions over the Internet. Yet, an unambiguous definition of the term is difficult to 
formulate [1].
Financial institutions underpinning the economy and the operation of national 
critical infrastructures, such as monitoring and control of the electricity supply, are 
now dependent on the Internet. A consequence of this is that cyberattacks become 
more costly for the victims and perversely more attractive to the criminals who 
carry them out [2]. The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) and edge computing 
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as a new paradigm creates the potential for enhanced productivity but at the same 
time opens up new opportunities for cyberattacks while still being exposed to exist-
ing attack vectors such as the well-known denial of service attack (DDoS), which 
can take place in many forms [3].
In this chapter, we described the challenges in building an edge system that 
is secure against cyberattack. We begin by briefly reviewing the architecture of 
communications over the Internet and later consider the new challenges that follow 
from operating the hardware with values of voltage, frequency and current that 
enable more energy efficiency.
2. The structure of the internet: security from data Centre to the edge
There is a proverb in the English language that says that a chain is only as strong 
as its weakest link. This applies directly as a basic principle of cybersecurity. Edge 
computing still requires communications to a central data centre, at least some of 
the time. It follows that it is necessary to consider carefully the WAN and LAN tech-
nologies used. Figure 1 illustrates the networking technologies used and shows the 
position of edge computing within the wider fog computing environment, which 
we describe in a later part of this section. The section begins by discussing each 
networking technology separately and in doing so refers briefly to the history of the 
development of data networking technologies in general and to the development of 
the Internet in particular.
2.1 WAN technologies—circuit-based communications
The core transmission technology of the global telephone system developed 
over several decades from using electromechanical switches and frequency division 
multiplexing to use digital signals and time division multiplexing by the 1980s. 
Signals from different sources were multiplexed together in a hierarchy of data rates 
(2.048 Mbps, 8.448 Mbs, 34.368 Mbps, etc.) for transport across the core network 
Figure 1. 
Illustration of the hierarchy of devices creating the fog computing environment.
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before being demultiplexed for transmission to individual receivers. The concept of 
a unique end-to-end circuit from sender remained clearly identifiable.
The initial plesiochronous digital hierarchy (PDH) handled the fact that lower 
bit rate sources were not time synchronised (each source had its own clock) by 
adopting the technique of bit stuffing in order to ensure that the higher rate chan-
nels were time synchronised. Thus, equipment inserted extra bits, as needed, at the 
transmitter and then the receiver removed these bits.
As fibre optic became widely used in the telecommunications industry, PDH 
was replaced by a different, more scalable, multiplexing technology known as the 
synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) in which the equipment across the network 
is synchronised. SDH works on copper lines and on radio signals as well as fibre 
optic cables. The ITU-T [4] develops standards for SDH globally. The United States 
developed the technology under the name Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) 
around the same time as the ITU-T. In SDH, an aggregate signal composed of virtual 
containers (VCs) of fixed size is transmitted at a fixed frequency between two 
pieces of SDH equipment. Each tributary signal arriving at the sender from a source 
is assigned to one of the VCs with a pointer indicating where the signal is located 
within the container. Thus by allowing the pointer to vary, the tributary signals are 
adapted to the synchronised clock of the transmitter and receiver.
While a transmission from source to receiver will pass though many different 
VCs as it transits the SDH network, essentially using a different VC on each point to 
point link, the concept of an identifiable circuit remains intact in SDH. This means 
that distinct users and applications are clearly separated despite the fact that they 
are carried over the same fibre, wire or radio link. Even if one captures the complete 
SDH aggregate signal, without knowledge of the mapping of users and applica-
tions to the VCs in the signal, it is essentially impossible to extract the targeted 
data stream.
2.2 Packet communications
The circuit concept in the telephone system described in the above section builds 
on the idea of reserving bandwidth between the transmitter and receiver although 
as we have mentioned this confers a certain level of security by separating the signal 
from others on the same physical medium.
An alternative approach that is available when the transmission is in digital 
form is to break it into parts and then to transmit these parts in sequence across the 
digital network. We can define a packet to have three parts: a header, a payload and 
optionally a trailer. Each part of the digital data is placed uniquely into one packet 
and the header defines the information that allows the packet to be transmitted 
across the digital network. This type of transmission, known as packet switching, 
is the primary basis for data communications in computer networks, whether local 
or wide area. The definition of the fields in the header (and trailer, if present) plus 
the functionality associated with each field defines a protocol. The development of 
early networks, such as the ARPANET discovered that it was useful to encapsulate 
protocols within other protocols leading to the concept of a layered stack. This was 
eventually formalised in the definition of a seven-layer abstract model known as the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model [5].
As the Internet was adopted globally in the 1990s, intense efforts were applied 
to use the existing global SDH network, as the wide area networking technol-
ogy (WAN), to carry the packet protocols that underpin the physical layers of 
the Internet. Packet over SONET (POS) was developed, defined in RFC 2615 
[6] initially, as a way of transmitting packet-based data protocols using point 
to point protocol (PPP) on each point to point link in an SDH/SONET network. 
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POS includes the option to apply scrambling to the transmission thereby adding  
an extra layer of security.
2.3 From cloud to edge to fog computing
The global adoption of the Internet enabled cloud computing paradigm. Large 
data centres, using virtualisation technology, can offer end users scalable compute 
resource on a pay per use basis. This approach is well suited to traditional enterprise 
computing freeing businesses from capital expenditure on computing systems 
transferring the cost to operational expenditure and off-loading risk to cloud 
service providers.
Newer applications, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), involve data collection 
at end user devices, equipment that is often mobile and therefore linked by wireless 
to edge nodes. The complete system is geographically diverse, with Smart Cities 
being one of the best illustrations of this being. The opportunity to redistribute 
computation across the hierarchy from user device, through edge, and back to the 
data centre when needed is now called fog computing. A hypothetical IoT service 
with a target end-to-end latency of 200 ms can easily expect, for a roundtrip to the 
cloud, to spend half of its budget in the network. This leaves a very tight time bud-
get for execution of the actual processing to at the data centre. Fog has the potential 
to eliminate most, if not all, of the communication latency and, therefore, can 
permit the option of running the edge systems at lower frequency and voltage; for 
example, operating at 50% of the peak frequency with 30% less voltage translates 
to running with 50% less energy and 75% less power. Edge servers can also benefit 
from virtualisation, running multiple virtual machines to separate functionality. 
Furthermore research suggests that compute accelerators, in particular GPUs, may 
be enabled at the edge though virtualisation [7].
Figure 2 shows an analysis of the operation of an edge server, operating in 
extended margins, presented by the Horizion 2020 project Uniserver (http://www.
uniserver2020.eu). UniServer created a cross layer approach from the hardware 
levels up to the system software layers. The following system enhancements were 
identified:
i. at the circuit, micro-architecture and architecture layer by automatically 
revealing the possible operating points (i.e. voltage, frequency) of each 
hardware component no worse than the worst-case operating points used, 
thus helping to boost performance or energy efficiency at levels closer to the 
Pareto front maximising the returns from technology scaling;
ii. at the firmware layer with low-level handlers by monitoring and control-
ling the operating status of the underlying hardware components and 
updating a ‘HealthLog’, as well as performing periodical benchmarking of 
the hardware and reporting the findings in a ‘StressLog’. The logs with the 
collected information are communicated to the software stack (hypervisor) 
in a generic way, allowing easy adoption and exploitation of the observed 
margins;
iii. at the software layer by enabling an easy programmability, ensuring high 
dependability and full utilisation of the margins observed in the underlying 
hardware. State-of-the-art software packages for virtualisation (i.e. KVM) 
and resource management (i.e. OpenStack) will be ported on the micro-
server further strengthening its advantages with minimum intrusion and 
easy adoption.
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In this chapter, we focus on the security challenges at the edge components and 
as we have outlined the WANs that link these edge nodes back to the data centres.
3. Cyber security at the edge
The edge computing paradigm moves significant amounts of computation from 
the data centre closer to the source of the data, reducing but not eliminating the 
need for packet communications. It follows that there are larger number of smaller 
servers deployed at the edge and therefore energy efficiency of the server operation 
becomes a significant factor. Edge servers have fewer CPUs and less DRAM and 
limited power budgets when compared to rack mounted servers in data centres. One 
driver for this is often the fact that physical form factor of the edge server is signifi-
cantly limited compared to rack space in the data centre.
Manufacturers of server components define operational limits for parameters 
such as voltage, frequency and current. Routine adherence to these limits in the 
production of commercial servers reflects, in part, the need to account for the 
expected performance degradation of transistors and potential functionality fail-
ures due to the increased transistor variability in nanometre technologies. In gen-
eral, the values adopted are quite pessimistic. DRAM manufacturers, in an effort 
to limit the potential faults, adopt a high operating supply voltage and refresh rate 
according to the assumed rare worst-case conditions [7]. This leads to the obser-
vation that DRAM alone can account for up to 40% power usage. Researchers 
have however investigated the operation of these electrical components in regions 
Figure 2. 
Perspective from the UniServer project on the enhancement of the edge server.
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of voltage and current beyond the conservative limits [8] and report 8.6% system 
energy savings on average for non-virtualised and 8.4% for virtualised workloads 
while ensuring the seamless server operation even under extreme temperatures.
Relaxation of voltage, timing and refresh-rate limitations may put at risk the 
correct functionality of the CPUs and DRAMs due to the potential failures that 
may occur at lower voltages and dynamically changing operating/environmental 
conditions (e.g. temperature). Such timing and memory failures may disrupt the 
operation of the server and/or directly impact the expected Quality of Service 
(QoS), which can be quantified in terms of throughput and quality-of-results (e.g. 
in terms of Bit-Error-Rate). As a consequence, such failures will affect service 
level agreements (SLA) in terms of availability, latency, accuracy and throughput 
as agreed at the higher level between the service user and the service provider. A 
further consequence of operating in these extended margins is that new security 
vulnerabilities may arise in addition to the cyber threats that already exist.
In contrast to a centralised cloud data centre, edge deployments will be consti-
tuted from many small clusters or individual installations, where elevated levels of 
physical security are not economically viable. Physical security of the micro-server 
may consist primarily of a light-weight enclosure and, from a security perspective, 
it should be assumed that a determined attacker will be able to gain full access to 
the system. This creates a larger threat surface, which now incorporates physical 
attacks, posing threats to the micro-server and the wider network it connects to. 
Deployments at the edge should be made under the assumption that networks are 
operating over untrustworthy links, with the use of encrypted tunnelling through 
VPNs, malware detection, firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems and 
DNSSEC all considerations for an endpoint security policy.
Threats posed by attackers gaining physical access to a system require con-
sideration from both hardware and software security disciplines. Applications 
developers should employ secure coding practises, particularly when operating on 
any sensitive information. Care should also be taken to minimise, or, if possible, to 
avoid the storage of secret information in physical memory. The use of software, or 
ideally hardware-based, hard disk encryption technologies can offer protections, 
even when the disk is removed from a system.
Side-channel attacks can potentially be used to reveal sensitive information. In 
the UniServer system, sensitive extended margin information could be targeted to 
create denial of service attacks or cause system instability. The variation of voltage 
and frequency margins, core features of the UniServer solution, may also influence 
the relative amount of side-channel leakages. Side-channel resilient counter-
measures, employing masking and hiding strategies, should be employed to help 
counteract such threats.
The differing deployment architectures of full stack and bare metal are con-
sidered. In the full stack deployment, representing a micro-server data centre, 
the UniServer software is running under the host OS, abstracted from other guest 
applications under separate virtual machines. However, in the bare metal deploy-
ment, the UniServer software runs along-side other system applications. It is in this 
deployment architecture where the UniServer system is most exposed to interfer-
ence by other applications. The UniServer log files are identified as high value assets 
that need to be protected from tampering, since it could potentially lead to system 
instability or denial of service attacks. It is therefore a recommendation that the log 
and policy files are stored in an encrypted format, to avoid reading and manipula-
tion by others. Additionally, consideration should be given as to whether the files 
should be digitally signed, to provide assurance that they come from a trusted 
source. These recommendations would naturally have overheads in terms of real-
time operation, so their implementation would need to be considered carefully in 
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terms of system performance. The use of encryption, and possibly digital signing, 
will likely be candidate to form a security solution.
3.1 General attack vectors
In this section we consider the threats posed to both traditional networked 
server infrastructure and to the class of physical attacks, discussing the threats and 
countermeasures used to mitigate against them.
The primary aims of information security are to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of a system [9]. There is generally no single solution to a 
security problem, since threats and vulnerabilities originate from many sources; 
rather the aim is to provide a series-layered security response, delivering defence 
in depth. An overall security response should be considered in the wider sense, 
consisting of measures that span the range of administrative, logical/technical and 
physical solutions.
3.1.1 Security of the operating system
The operating system (OS) is the fundamental software layer upon which the 
rest of the system software is built. In the common four-ring model, shown in 
Figure 3, the operating system is separated into two distinct regions of Kernel 
space, incorporating kernel memory, components and drivers from rings 0 to 2, and 
user space in ring 3, where end user applications may be run.
For most commercial operating systems, control of user access is organised 
under discretionary access control (DAC), providing privileges at the individual 
user account level. However, unlike a system under mandatory access control 
(MAC), where applications run in isolated memory with strong separation, typical 
OS’s are running in a multi-tasking environment where resources are shared and are 
potentially accessible between applications [10]. Security is, therefore, ultimately 
left up to the system administrator to ensure that appropriate measures are in place 
and that the system is configured appropriately. Some general recommendations 
for operating system security, which apply to both cloud and edge deployments, are 
summarised below [11].
Figure 3. 
Layers of protection in the operating system.
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3.1.2 System integrity
• Build production systems from a known and repeatable process to ensure 
system integrity.
• Check systems periodically against snapshots of the original system.
• Use available third-party auditing software to check system integrity.
• Backup system resources on a regular basis.
3.1.3 User accounts
• Limit the number of user accounts.
• Ensure that only a few trusted users have administrative access.
• Assign the minimum required access permissions for the account that runs an 
application.
3.1.4 Password policies
• Require the use of secure passwords, that is, passwords of sufficient length, 
using a mix of letters, numbers and symbols. Do not re-use passwords and 
avoid the use of any personal information or dictionary words.
• Use automated tools to try and crack any weak passwords and require their 
update by users.
• On a UNIX operating system, activate the shadow password file.
• Use two-factor authentication.
3.1.5 File system
• Deny access by default.
• Provide minimal access rights where necessary, for example, read only.
3.1.6 Network services
• Provide the minimum number of required services.
• Reduce the level of access permissions for network services users.
• Ensure that user accounts that have access to the Web server do not have access 
to shell functions.
• For UNIX/Linux, ensure that unused services do not exist in the rc files, rc0-
rc6, in the /etc. directory.
• Ensure that unused services are not running, and that they do not start auto-
matically on MS Windows.
9Security at the Edge
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• Reduce the number of trusted ports specified in the /etc./services file.
• Protect your system against NetBIOS threats associated with ports 137, 138 
and 139.
• Use wrapper services, such as iptables.
• Avoid using services that have a GUI, since such services introduce many 
known vulnerabilities.
3.1.7 System patches
• Run the latest, vendor-recommended patches for the operating system.
• Schedule regular maintenance of security patches.
3.1.8 Operating system minimisation
• Remove non-essential applications to reduce possible system vulnerabilities.
• Restrict local services to those required for operation.
• Implement protection for buffer overflow.
3.1.9 Logging and monitoring
• Log security-related events, including successful and failed logons, logoffs and 
changes to user permissions.
• Monitor system log files.
• Use a time server to correlate time for forensics.
• Secure the system log files by restricting access permissions to them.
• Secure the logging configuration file.
• Consider the use of a remote server for storage of logging information.
• Enable logging of access requests on web servers.
3.1.10 Hyperjacking
Hypervisor technology enables the deployment of numerous virtual machines 
(VMs) on the one system, indeed it is a key concept in shared cloud infrastructure. 
However, the deployment of multiple systems adds complexity and consequently 
the possibility for new exploits. The term virtualisation escape, or VMEscape, 
refers to the process by which an attacker can escape the confines of the virtual 
environment and is then able to exploit the host OS. Virtualised systems should 
therefore still be deployed under the supervision of firewalls, while guests with 
differing security levels, such as DMZ and internal, should not be combined on the 
same host.
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It has been reported that malware rootkits have also been developed that act as 
hypervisors, installing themselves below operating systems, in a process referred 
to as hyperjacking. Since this software operates ostensibly outside the scope of the 
operating system, it can evade malware scans and also spy on the system, gathering 
information such as logging of passwords. In 2009, researchers from Microsoft and 
North Carolina State University revealed Hooksafe [12], a hypervisor class anti-
rootkit, aiming to demonstrate the provision of generic protection against kernel-
mode rootkits.
3.1.11 Network attacks
Access via network ports forms the basis of most remote attacks on cloud-based 
infrastructure. The ports of machines around the world are continually being 
probed to see if any ports have been left open or unsecured. It is therefore a basic 
preventative measure to close any unused ports and restrict access and secure those 
essential ports that are required to remain open. Improperly implemented TCP/IP 
stacks are vulnerable to various attacks such as buffer overflows, SYN flood attacks, 
denial of service attacks such as Smurf, ping and Fraggle and fragment attacks such 
as Teardrop to name but a few. These attacks can be largely mitigated by applying 
the appropriate configuration to disable services and apply the relevant patches.
Under the assumption that edge-deployed servers are more exposed, there are 
numerous means by which the traditional networking security elements of fire-
walls, proxies, virus scanners can be circumvented, creating a means by which other 
nodes of the network may be exposed. In 2014, the Gameover Zeus (GOZ) botnet 
was responsible for the global distribution of the CryptoLocker ransomware, which 
encrypted the victim’s hard drive and required payment to receive the decryp-
tion key.
Since network connections could be exposed, the communications channel of 
an edge device should be considered untrustworthy, since attacks such as eaves-
dropping on network traffic, man-in-the-middle, modification or replay attacks 
are all possible. It is recommended that an encrypted VPN tunnel should be used 
between the edge server and other elements of the network to mitigate against such 
attacks.
DNS hijacking exploits the vulnerability in the way local or caching DNS servers 
obtain information from root servers regarding the identity of the authoritative 
servers for a domain. It is possible for an attacker to send falsified replies, and thus 
control the domain resolution, forwarding the user to the attacker’s server [13]. The 
most effective countermeasure against DNS hijacking is to upgrade DNS to Domain 
Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC).
When considering the above attacks, it is evident that edge deployments should 
incorporate their own endpoint security, consisting of elements such as inbound/
outbound firewalls, malware scanning and intrusion detection/prevention systems 
as necessary security countermeasures.
3.2 Physical attacks and countermeasures for edge deployments
We now turn our attention to the situation in which a determined attacker has 
been able to bypass the limited protections of an enclosure and has gained direct 
physical access to the system, providing an enhanced ability to tamper with the 
system. There are many such physical attacks referenced in the literature; here 
we aim to give an overview of attacks, providing examples for the most relevant 
and practical attacks, along with examples of suggested countermeasures to those 
attacks.
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3.2.1 Memory attacks
High-performance, processor-based, systems will generally include the fol-
lowing types of memory: L1/L2/L3 cache, DRAM, Flash Firmware and Hard-Disk 
Drives. Each of these is a potential threat vector for an attacker.
3.2.2 Timing attacks
Timing attacks exploit the differences in time required to perform specific 
operations. For example, the time required to calculate division and multiplication 
instructions, or the time necessary to fetch data when a cache hit, or cache miss, 
is experienced. Similarly, the difference in timings when conditional branching 
is used, or when optimisations are used by a programmer to skip unnecessary 
operations, may improve application performance but at the same time can reveal 
sensitive information about underlying code and values being processed. A clas-
sic example was shown by Kocher in [14] where the timings for modular multiply 
operations in exponentiation operations, and modulo reductions of the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem (CRT) optimisation in RSA, could lead to the discovery of the 
entire encryption key on a PC.
An example of a remote network-based attack is that of Bernstein in [15], 
demonstrating a timing attack on OpenSSL AES, on a UNIX x86 server. The server 
was profiled using a known key to determine the timing characteristics for the input 
plaintext values. During the attack, plaintexts were sent to the server, with their 
timing profiles compared to the profiled reference. The information leakage was 
reported to be due to the non-constant timing of table lookups.
Cache-timing attacks were first proposed by Page in [16] and demonstrated 
by Tsunoo et al. in [17], where DES was broken with a > 90% success rate. In [18], 
Tromer et al. showed that the full AES key could be extracted using DM-CRYPT 
disk encryption on Linux with only 800 accesses to an encrypted file. The attack 
took 65 ms of measurement time and 3 seconds to analyse. The OpenSSL library 
was also attacked in as little as 13 ms, with 300 encryptions.
Countermeasures to timing attacks generally aim to perform operations in 
constant time. However, this is not a straight-forward task since compilers can 
often provide optimisations that affect timing behaviour. In addition, cache hits 
and variances in instruction timings are generally outside the control of the soft-
ware designer. A clock-skipping countermeasure was initially proposed by Kocher 
in [19], which inserted random delays to try and break up characteristic timing 
patterns, but this was later shown to be equivalent to adding noise to the power 
waveforms and could be overcome by analysis with a larger number of traces.
In [18], Tromer et al. considered various countermeasures against cache attacks. 
They suggested:
1. Avoid the use of memory accesses by replacing lookups with equivalent logical 
operations. This is a possibility for algorithms such as AES. However, there will 
be a performance trade-off.
2. Use of a bit-slicing approach.
3. Use of a cache no-fill mode, where memory is accessed from the cache during a 
hit and serviced from memory when there is a cache miss.
4. Dynamic table storage, where the contents of the table lookup are cycled 
around in memory during encryption operations to de-correlate it.
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Guidance for coding standards for cryptographic implementations in soft-
ware can be found in [20]. For example, in the context of timing attacks, it is 
recommended:
1. Do not compare secret values on a byte-by-byte basis.
2. Avoid branching predicated on secret data.
3. Avoid the use of lookup tables indexed by secret data.
4. Avoid loops that are bounded by a secret value.
The software developer can also make use of libraries, written with security in 
mind, such as NaCl [21] and some processors also include custom instruction sets 
dedicated to cryptography, such as the Intel AES-NI instructions referenced in [22] 
and the ARM cryptography extensions discussed in ARMv8 [23].
3.2.3 DRAM attacks
Buffer Overflow is a well-known attack that can enable execution of malicious 
code. Strategies to counteract this attack include the use of improved input valida-
tion and bounds checking at the programmer level, or at the system level through 
approaches such as the randomisation of memory layout or the structuring of 
buffer memory to incorporate memory spaces, sometimes termed ‘canaries’, that 
actively monitor to detect when unauthorised overflows occur.
The purposeful use of errors, exceptions and crashes can also be used to initi-
ate memory dumping, where the entire contents of system memory are exported 
to enable readout of sensitive values stored in memory. It is recommended that 
sensitive values should not be stored in memory in the clear, rather they should be 
stored in encrypted form, or represented as hashed values and compared against 
re-computed hashes when required.
With direct physical access to a system, such as with an exposed and isolated 
edge server, an attacker can potentially remove DIMM memory modules from the 
system board. As described in [24], the use of cooling sprays can enable a DIMM 
memory module to retain memory, without error, for several minutes. The memory 
can then be plugged into another system and sensitive information read out. This 
attack has been shown to make on-the-fly software-based disk encryption systems 
such as BitLocker, FileVault and TrueCrypt vulnerable. One countermeasure 
approach would be to avoid the use of pre-computed tables of information for 
encryption routines, which would typically be stored in DRAM, although this 
will have performance penalties associated with it since the values will need to be 
computed on-demand each time.
RowHammer is a more recent memory attack that exploits a weakness identi-
fied in commodity DRAMs, where repeated row activations can cause bits to flip 
in adjacent rows. A recent attack [25] used generic memory functions such as libc, 
memset and memcpy for attack primitives, making the attack more accessible.
3.2.4 Re-flashing attacks
Re-flash attacks target the replacement of existing system firmware with that of 
compromised firmware images. This can enable attackers to circumvent protections 
that would otherwise be in place. Due to the low-level nature of firmware access and 
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control, such attacks can have a powerful effect on a system. Countermeasures may 
include incorporating password access for flashing operations.
3.2.5 Hard disk drive attacks
Hard drives will generally host the main operating system and the application 
software that loads on the system, but also potentially swap page information, 
which may hold sensitive information temporarily stored from primary DRAM 
memory. Hard disks, and particularly hot-swappable server-class drives, can be 
removed from a system at ease, and then connected to another system by plugging 
in a power and data cable. The disks can then be mounted as secondary drives to 
be copied, interrogated, or have additional malware or software installed. All of 
this is outside the scope of any protection from intrusion prevention systems of the 
original host. It is therefore advisable to consider the deployment of disk encryption 
technologies, such as software-based encryption, or preferably, hardware-based 
total disk encryption.
3.2.6 Side-channel attacks
We now consider a class of physical attacks termed as side-channel attacks. 
These attacks target the leakage of information from a system and are primarily 
concerned with the discovery of the secret information such as encryption keys that 
underpins modern cryptographic processing. The same approach can be targeted 
at modelled leakages of any other high-value information that is processed in a 
system.
3.2.7 Power analysis attacks
Power analysis is a powerful technique used to obtain side-channel information 
from a system. The power analysis attack can be categorised into two types: simple 
power analysis and differential power analysis.
In simple power analysis, the individual power waveform acquisitions are 
observed to see if information can be gleaned from them. In the attack of [14], it 
was observed that a single power consumption trace could reveal the entire encryp-
tion key by simply interpreting the pattern of the power trace, since modular 
multiply operations in exponentiation operations took varying times depending on 
whether the portion of the encryption key was a ‘1’ or a ‘0’.
In differential power analysis (DPA), a series of power consumption measure-
ments are recorded while the device is processing the target information, typically 
a secret encryption key, and is then compared against a set of hypothesised power 
models to determine a portion of the key. The analysis is repeated for the remain-
der of the key portions until the complete encryption key is recovered, enabling 
the attacker to decrypt any data, previously encrypted with the same key. Power 
consumption is typically modelled by estimating the number of ‘1’s in a register via 
a Hamming weight or Hamming distance power model. Several differing methods 
of statistically comparing the modelled versus measured power consumptions are 
commonly used, such as difference of means, distance of means and Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient [26].
Power analysis attacks are device specific and it can take from several hundred, 
to several million, traces to break an implementation with a DPA attack; this is 
dependent on the signal/noise (S/N) ratio and whether any countermeasures are 
present. Research has been carried out on a multitude of low-frequency embedded 
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systems, where the approach has proved very successful. The attack works best 
when a clean voltage signal is available, preferably from the processor core of the 
device, where S/N is typically optimal; however, attacks can also be mounted by 
measuring the global power supply of a device through the voltage drop across a 
small resistor placed between supply and ground. There are fewer published works 
that address attacks on full-scale server boards, due to the additional complexities 
introduced by higher frequencies of operation, lack of access to processor core volt-
age and the additional noise generated by numerous system hardware elements.
Countermeasures against power analysis attacks aim to break the statistical 
link between the power consumption and the sensitive intermediate data values. 
For defence against simple power analysis, countermeasures primarily focus on 
disturbing the power waveform to disrupt the observable pattern, and so remove 
the discernible information. This can be accomplished by increasing background 
noise signals, introducing random insertions or delays, or by removing conditional 
branching and employing constant time algorithms.
Protecting a device from DPA is a much more challenging task, since this attack 
uses advanced statistical techniques to extract information from many traces. 
Countermeasures can be classed into two broad categories, namely whether they 
aim to hide or mask the data [27]. Hiding approaches do not attempt to change 
the intermediate values that are processed, rather they try to change the power 
waveform by applying some randomisation or by making it constant. Randomising 
approaches were mentioned above for simple power analysis measures and could 
also include approaches such as shuffling or skipping of instruction clocks. To 
make the power consumption constant, approaches have been proposed such as 
the use of dual-rail pre-charge (DRP) logic styles, which uses two wires that are 
complementary for each signal. Other logic styles, such as Sense Amplifier Balanced 
Logic (SABL), were proposed by Tiri et al. in [28] to provide resistance against 
DPA. However, these approaches require custom ASIC design with careful layout 
considerations and have still been shown to be vulnerable to DPA attacks.
The masking countermeasure aims to change the sensitive intermediate values 
by applying and then removing a temporary mask operation, a simple example 
being an XOR with a random value. This then breaks the link between what the 
power model expects and what is processed inside the device. The disadvantage of 
masking is that it can require the application and removal of multiple masks, for 
example switching between Boolean and multiplicative masks. This has a process-
ing overhead and can be complicated to design and implement.
3.2.7.1 Electro-magnetic attacks
Electro-magnetic (EM) attacks [29] are a variation of power analysis attacks. 
They differ in the method of acquisition, which uses an electric or magnetic field 
probe to convert EM radiation into voltage signals that are proportional to the power 
consumption. The probing is generally classed as being either near-field or far-field. 
Near-field probing is considered to be the short-range distance that is typically less 
than one-wavelength from the source. At this distance, the field strength is propor-
tional to 1/r3 in strength, therefore placing the probe as close as possible to the source 
will maximise signal strength. A more invasive attack can be to remove the chip pack-
age surface and enable a fine point-tip probe to be placed very close to the exposed 
integrated circuit (IC); however, this requires more time and generally a laboratory 
environment. A less invasive approach is to rest a simple loop antenna or EM probe 
tip against the surface of the IC, and to use active amplification to improve signal 
strength for appropriate quantisation scaling during acquisition.
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Far-field EM attacks work at multiple wavelength distances and typically use 
a high-frequency directional antenna to receive signals. The waveforms being 
captured here have escaped the confines of the near field and are propagating over 
free space [30]. This form of attack would likely only be possible for exposed, non-
shielded enclosures.
An EM acquisition can have advantages over that of traditional power analysis 
attacks. Firstly, it can have a lower invasiveness. In comparison to a power analysis 
attack, where a resistor may need to be soldered into place, the EM probe can often 
be placed in close proximity, without any evidence of tampering. Secondly, there is 
the possibility to improve the localisation of the probe, that is, to position it directly 
around the circuitry processing the sensitive information. This can help reduce the 
contributions of the EM fields generated from other elements of the overall power 
consumption. This can improve the S/N ratio, making it easier to visually identify 
leakages on an oscilloscope and improves the statistical analysis.
The countermeasures of hiding and masking, discussed above, also provide 
general protection against both EM analysis. However, for non-invasive attacks with 
an EM probe, physical shielding countermeasures can offer some further resistance. 
In [31], Yamaguchi et al. applied thin magnetic film to shield an integrated circuit 
device and reported a 6 dB reduction in magnetic field signal strength.
3.2.7.2 Profiling attacks
Profiling, or template, attacks [32, 33] use a reference device to build a char-
acteristic power model of a device for various test inputs. The power model can 
then be compared against the power consumption measurements of an identical 
device to reveal what data have been processed internally. The template attack can 
potentially reveal the secret key with as little as one power trace; however, to obtain 
a power model with high fidelity may require the acquisition and pre-processing 
of many power traces, which may be a time-consuming exercise. Masking or the 
randomisation of execution order could be used as potential countermeasures.
3.2.7.3 Machine learning attacks
Machine learning is an emerging approach to side-channel attacks. Although 
numerous algorithms can potentially be used, the specific feature selection and 
data set size have the major influence on the success of the attack. Examples of 
approaches are supervised learning, support vector machines, random forest, 
neural networks and unsupervised learning. To date, most research has focussed 
on support vector machines [34–36], random forest [37] and neural networks 
[38]. Countermeasures to machine learning may include higher order masking 
approaches and the use of poisoned data.
3.2.8 Fault attacks
Fault attacks aim to induce erroneous behaviour in devices by inserting tran-
sient faults that propagate through the system and reveal secret information as a 
consequence. The transient nature of the targeted faults means that an attack can 
be attempted repeatedly, and the attack developed. This approach means that no 
permanent damage is caused to the device and therefore it is less likely that any 
evidence remains that an attack has taken place. In [39, 40] it was shown that faults 
could be induced in smart card devices by varying the system supply voltage, clock 
speed and ambient temperatures. Since these same characteristics are altered in 
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UniServer, it is an area of active investigation in the project, for example in terms of 
generation of memory and system errors.
Fault attacks in the literature have targeted both public and private key algo-
rithms. Consider, for example, the attack on the Chinese reminder theorem (CRT) 
computation in RSA of [41] and the targeting of AES in [42, 43]. The attack of [43] 
demonstrating that inducing two faults in the 9th round of AES key scheduling 
was enough to break the encryption system. For active attacks, the most common 
approach is that of fault injections, as detailed in [44].
Countermeasures to fault injections include established techniques in communica-
tions engineering, such as the use of error codes and parity checking, along with newer 
proposals such as concurrent error detection (CED) which suppress the operation of 
a circuit when error states are detected. The aim of CED is to halt the propagation of 
the error to the output, where the attacker can analyse whether the fault attack was 
successful or not. Additional proposals for countermeasures include the duplication 
of circuitry, or repeated computation, to provide comparators. With duplication of 
hardware the cost penalty is high, while with repeated computation the execution time 
may increase significantly. Other, more efficient, schemes have been proposed, such 
as suggested in [45], requiring only one parity bit for each internal state of AES. The 
approach detects all odd errors, and in many cases the even errors, and may be a 
promising approach for implementation in both the hardware and software contexts.
Proposals have also been made to secure the CRT computations of RSA. In [46], 
the arguments of the CRT were calculated using an approach termed efficient 
redundancy, where values are verified before their use in the RSA algorithm. This 
approach, which adds little timing overhead, improves upon previous approaches 
requiring full redundancy.
3.2.9 Out-of-order execution attacks
At the time of writing, two new side-channel attacks [47], targeting the out-of-
order execution of instructions on processors, were announced. Meltdown exploits 
the scenario where a speculatively executed instruction, although aborted, permits the 
bypassing of memory protections and thus the ability to read Kernel memory from 
user space. The attack is deemed to affect Intel processors primarily. In the short-term, 
a patch based on the KAISER countermeasure of [48] has been released. This counter-
measure re-maps the memory space in software. A more permanent solution will likely 
require architectural changes at the hardware level to control the order of permission 
checks for access to memory and improvements to memory segmentation.
The Spectre attack exploits the use of speculative branch predictions to store 
information to cache memory that can then be targeted with side-channel tech-
niques such as flush+reload or evict+reload cache attacks. The attack is considered 
more universal than Meltdown, and has already been shown to affect Intel, AMD 
and ARM processors. Countermeasures against Spectre also appear difficult to 
implement. Simply disabling speculative execution would result in an unaccept-
able performance loss, while inserting temporary blocking instructions is also 
seen as a challenging task. Potential updates to processor microcode may be pos-
sible as a form of software patch, but likely to impact performance considerably.
4. Conclusions
The move from cloud deployment model to the edge has implications for secu-
rity. In contrast to a cloud data centre, housed within a large building complex with 
a significant level of security, the edge deployment will constitute a large number of 
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small clusters or individual installations, where high levels of physical security are 
not economically viable. In many situations, physical security of the micro-server 
may consist primarily of a light-weight enclosure, designed to protect the system 
from environmental factors and vandalism or casual tampering efforts. For the 
determined attacker, this may not prove to be an effective barrier and it should be 
assumed that a realistic worst-case scenario is that an attacker will be able to gain 
full access to the system. This then creates a larger threat surface, now incorporating 
physical attacks that can be used to compromise the individual micro-server, and 
potentially, the wider network.
Deployment at the edge still requires the implementation of traditional server 
and network security practises, such as those outlined in this chapter. In addition, 
deployment at the edge should assume that networks are operating over untrust-
worthy links and therefore the use of encrypted tunnelling through VPNs, and the 
use of malware detection, firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems and 
DNSSEC should all be considered as forming the basis of an endpoint security policy.
The use of virtualisation is a core element of cloud and resource sharing tech-
nologies; however, it also opens the possibility for attacks exploiting VMEscape. 
Accommodating guests with differing security levels, such as DMZ and internal, on 
the same host, should be avoided.
Edge deployment should consider the further threats posed from an attacker 
gaining partial, or full, physical access to a system. This requires input not only from 
a hardware security standpoint, but also from software perspectives. Applications 
developers should employ secure coding practises, particularly when operating on 
any sensitive information, as highlighted in the discussions of memory attacks in 
Section 2.2.1. Care should also be taken to minimise or, if possible, to avoid the stor-
age of secret information in physical memory, since attacks such as buffer overflows 
and removal of frozen DRAM modules have been shown as effective means to 
extract information stored in the clear. User passwords, for example, should be 
stored as hashed values and passwords requested on demand for comparison or 
verification. The use of software, or ideally hardware-based, hard disk encryption 
technologies can offer protections, even when the disk is removed from a system.
Side-channel attacks can potentially be used to reveal sensitive information such 
as the extended margin information stored in the log and policy files. Indeed, the 
variation of voltage and frequency margins, core features of the UniServer solution, 
may also influence the relative amount of side-channel leakages. A countermeasure 
to this threat is the deployment of encryption using side-channel resilient counter-
measures, such as masking, to break the statistical link between power measure-
ments and hypothetical power models.
In the full stack deployment, representing a micro-server data centre, the 
UniServer software is running under the host OS, abstracted from guest applications 
operating under VMs. However, in the bare metal deployment, the UniServer soft-
ware runs along-side other system applications. It is in this deployment architecture 
where the UniServer system is most exposed to interference by other applications, 
which can potentially view and access each other’s files or resources. The UniServer 
log files were identified as high value assets that need to be protected from tamper-
ing, since it could potentially lead to system instability or denial of service attacks. It 
is therefore a recommendation that the log and policy files are stored in an encrypted 
format, to avoid reading and manipulation by others. Additionally, consideration 
should be given as to whether the files should be digitally signed, to provide assur-
ance that they come from a trusted source. These recommendations would naturally 
have overheads in terms of real-time operation, so their implementation would need 
to be considered carefully in terms of system performance. The use of encryption, 
and possibly digital signing, will likely be candidate to form a security solution.
Cloud Computing Security - Concepts and Practice
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